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EMBRACING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY TO
ELIMINATE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION CHAOS
Lindsey Trainor Golden*
INTRODUCTION
American Indians' living on reservations experience some of the
highest crime rates in the United States. Reservations endure vio-
lent crimes, including assault, domestic violence, and rape, at rates
2.5 times higher than the national average. These crimes have an
especially strong impact on Indian women: nearly three out of five
Indian women are assaulted by their spouses or partners, one in
three Indian women are raped in their lifetime, and Indian women
living on or near reservations are ten times more likely to be murder
victims than are women of any other race. High crime rates are not
limited to cases of domestic violence. For example, Indian reserva-
tions are also an attractive locale for narcotics manufacturing and
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1. For the purposes of this Note, I will use the terms "American Indians," "Indians,"
and "Native Americans" interchangeably. These terms do not encompass Alaska Natives and
Native Hawaiians.
2. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, VICTIM SERVICES,
http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/BLA/OJS/VictimServices/index.htm (last updated Feb.
17, 2012) (referring to a 2003 BIA report, which found that American Indians and Alaska
Natives are victims of violent crimes at rates more than twice the national average). In
2009, federal, state, and tribal agencies were aware of 5,650 instances of violent crime and
16,131 property crimes on reservations. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDI-
AN AFFAIRS, OFFENSES KNOWN To LAw ENFORCEMENT BY STATE, TRIBAL, AND OTHER
AGENCIES (2009), http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/2009-crime-in-the-us-copy-
of-09tbll I.pdf, also available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table 11.html.
3. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Law and Order Act Details, TURTLE TALK (July 19, 2010,
12:58 PM), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2010/07/19/tribal-law-and-order-act-details/.
4. Letter from U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE Assoc. ATr'Y GEN. TO TRIBAL
LEADERS (May 20, 2011), available at http://tloa.ncai.org/files/DOJ%2OFraming%
20Paper%20May%2020%202011.pdf.
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trafficking, due to their remote locations and the lack of tribal ju-
risdiction to prosecute non-Indian offenders.6
Despite these exceedingly high instances of crime, Indian wom-
en living on a reservation with their non-Indian spouses or
partners cannot seek justice in the tribal court system for crimes
committed against them by their partners, because under current
federal laws, tribes do not have the authority to prosecute crimes
committed by non-Indians on reservations. This gap in authority is
significant, as over 50% of married Indian women are married to
non-Indian husbands, and thousands of unmarried Indian women
are in relationships or have children with non-Indian men." Addi-
tionally, over 70% of violent crimes against Indian people are
committed by non-Indians." In most states, the responsibility for
prosecuting on-reservation crimes committed by non-Indians rests
solely with the federal government. 0 However, federal prosecutors
have insufficient resources to deal with domestic violence and mis-
demeanor cases." Additionally, some federal prosecutors' offices
are hundreds of miles away from reservations,1 2 which can inhibit
their ability to gather evidence in a timely matter. Evidence sug-
gests that these factors result in federal prosecutors declining to
prosecute an average of half of all reservation crimes that are sub-
ject to federal jurisdiction.'3
5. See, e.g., Amy Harris, Marijuana Growers Find Cover on Tribal Lands, THE SEATTLE
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2015994763
potbusts24m.html.
6. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (holding that
Indian tribes do not have the authority to prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed on
reservations); see also infra Part I-C.
7. See id.; see also infra Part I-C.
8. Letter from U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE Assoc. Arr'Y GEN. TO TRIBAL
LEADERS (May 20, 2011), available at http://tloa.ncai.org/files/DOJ%20Framing%20
Paper%20May%2020%20201 1.pdf.
9. See PAUL STEELE ET AL., CRIME AND THE NEW MEXICO RESERVATION: AN ANALYSIS
OF CRIME ON NATIVE AMERICAN LAND (1996-2002), EXEC. SUMMARY 2 (Oct. 2004), available
at http://www.dwiresourcecenter.org/downloads/pdf/NavajoCrimeAnalysis.pdf
10. See infra Part I-C. However, six states have been granted authority to prosecute on
Indian lands. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2006).
11. See Victor H. Holcomb, Prosecution of Non-Indians for Non-Serious Offenses Committed
Against Indians in Indian Country, 75 N.D. L. REv. 761, 767 (1999) (citing ROBERT N. CLIN-
TON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 279 (3d ed. 1991)) (arguing that
due to limited funding, the federal government is generally not equipped to prosecute
many non-major crimes, resulting in lower prosecution rates for non-major reservation
crimes).
12. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: ONE YEAR UPDATE 6 (2008), http://
www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/MazeOflnjustice_1yr.pdf; Holcomb, supra note 11, at 767 (noting
that the Fort Peck Reservation in Montana is over 250 miles away from the nearest federal
prosecutor's office).
13. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-167R, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: DEC-
LINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS 3, 10 (2010) (42% of declinations
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Tribal sovereignty is essential to the continued existence and
well-being of American Indian communities. Tribes are considered
a "third sovereign" within the United States-in addition to the
state and federal governments-and have been recognized as such
since the early history of the United States." The federal govern-
ment has signed treaties with many tribes, recognizing and
establishing a government-to-government relationship between the
United States and tribes." Despite this recognition of the unique
political status of Indian tribes, the federal government has
chipped away at tribal sovereignty since the treaty-making period
that took place when the United States was in its infancy.'" One of
the first laws passed for this purpose was the Major Crimes Act of
1885 (MCA), which extended federal law for major crimes, such as
rape and murder, into Indian reservations and provided for federal
jurisdiction over Indian defendants who committed those crimes.
The MCA challenges tribal sovereignty by imposing federal law
where tribes had preexisting mechanisms for handling criminal
disputes.
In addition to the MCA, a number of other statutes and court
decisions have limited Indian tribes' ability to independently pros-
ecute crimes committed within their geographic boundaries." This
is part of the reason that on-reservation crime rates are extremely
high, prosecution rates are low, and tribal sovereignty is impaired.2"
In 2010, Congress attempted to fix some of the problems resulting
from this dysfunctional policy, by passing the Tribal Law and Order
resulted from weak or insufficient admissible evidence), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d1 I 167r.pdf. See also Felicia Fonseca & Sudhin Thanawala, U.S. Declines to Try Half
the Crimes on Tribal Lands, AZCENTRAL (May 31, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/
news/articles/2011/05/31/20110531arizona-tribal-crimes-not-pursued.html#ixzzlOlyaOGYJ;
Ledyard King, GAO Report: Half of all Reservation Crime is not Prosecuted, THE BUFFALO POST,
(Dec. 15, 2010), http://buffalopost.net/?p=13075 (the declination rate for South Dakota is
61%, while for Arizona it is 38%).
14. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831) (finding that the Chero-
kee nation is "a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own
affairs and governing itself. . . .").
15. Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and
United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of ribal Sover-
eignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 657 (2009).
16. See infra Part I.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
18. See Warren Stapleton, Indian Country, Federal justice: Is the Exercise of Federal furisdic-
tion Under the Major Crimes Act Constitutional?, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 350 (1997).
19. See infra Parts I & III.
20. NAT'L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER BACKGROUND, http://
www.ncai.org/fileadmin/Tribal%2OLaw%20and%200rder%20Background.pdf (last visited
Feb. 4, 2011) ("Federal officials have declined to prosecute 50% of alleged violent crimes in
Indian country, including 75% of alleged sex crimes against women and children.").
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Act (TLOA) in July 2010.21 Congress and the executive branch have
also started to show more interest in recognizing and restoring
tribal sovereignty,22 but none of the proposed legislation fully sup-
ports Indian tribal sovereignty.
This Note argues that the current federal laws regarding tribal
criminal jurisdiction are contrary to existing policies that recognize
inherent tribal sovereignty, and that to fully restore tribal sover-
eignty and reduce reservation crime rates, Congress should revise
the MCA and the TLOA to comprehensively address the legal bar-
riers that adversely affect tribes' ability to prosecute crimes
committed within their geographic borders. Part I outlines the his-
torical progression of laws addressing criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country and identifies the problems with the law's disre-
gard and displacement of tribal sovereignty. Part II examines the
current state of criminal jurisdiction on reservations-focusing on
the lack of tribal input, legal ambiguities, and the under-inclusive
nature of the existing laws-and argues that recent shifts in federal
policy support broader recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty.
Part III explains why the current TLOA, when examined in the
context of historical acts of Congress and court decisions, does not
go far enough to fix either the barriers imposed on tribal sover-
eignty or the problems of reservation crime. Part IV proposes
revisions to the MCA and the TLOA to promote tribal sovereignty
and simplify criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.
I. HISTORICAL SURVEY OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTS AND SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS DEALING WITH INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
AND ON-RESERVATION CRIME
The following historical overview of the expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction into Indian Country illustrates how traditional
tribal authority over crimes committed within the tribes' geograph-
ical jurisdiction has been eroded by Congressional policies that
promoted assimilation rather than sovereignty.
A. CriminalJurisdiction in Indian Country Prior to the MCA
During the early 1800's, the U.S. Supreme Court, under Chief
Justice John Marshall, recognized that Indian tribes possessed in-
21. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010) (cod-
ified as amended in various sections of 25 U.S.C.).
22. See infra Part II.
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herent sovereignty over their own affairs, and recognized only two
limitations on tribal sovereignty. 3 First, tribes could not enter into
treaties with foreign nations because they are not themselves for-
eign nations, but rather are "domestic dependant nations" that
have a special relationship with the United States government.24
Second, tribes could not legally convey their land to any person or
entity other than the federal government.2" Justice Marshall's char-
acterization of tribal sovereignty in these early cases illustrates the
most important facet of tribal sovereignty: the powers exercised by
Indian tribes are inherent powers that they possessed even before
the creation of the United States, not powers granted to tribes by
the federal government.:
From 1778 until 1883, the United States signed numerous trea-
ties with Indian tribes.2  Some of these treaties stipulated how
crimes or offenses by non-Indians against Indians, and vice versa,
would be prosecuted. " One example of sovereignty recognition
appears in the 1778 Treaty with the Delaware Nation. This treaty
required that crimes committed by U.S. citizens against the Dela-
ware people, and vice versa, be prosecuted and tried impartially by
judges or juries from both nations.29 This procedure treated the
Delaware as a sovereign nation, creating a cooperative system to
deal with crime. A number of scholars, including Professor Robert
Clinton, have found that these treaties often recognized the sover-
eignty of Indian tribes, and therefore the tribes' jurisdiction over
crimes committed on their territories.o
23. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
24. See id. at 17; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 560-61 (1832) (holding that the
Cherokee nation is a distinct community "in which the laws of Georgia [could] have no
force," and that therefore the federal government had exclusive authority over Indian af-
fairs).
25. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823) (describing the "doctrine of discov-
ery," by which European powers obtained sovereignty over all American land by virtue of
"discovering" it and granted the discovering nation the exclusive right to extinguish the
occupancy rights of indigenous land occupants).
26. The existence of inherent tribal sovereignty also prevents the states from intruding
on tribal affairs. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
27. Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties: Vol. II Treaties in Part
(1904), available at http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/vol2/toc.htm.
28. See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokees,July 19, 1866, art. XIII, 14 Stat. 803 ("[T]he ju-
dicial tribunals of the [Cherokee] nation shall be allowed to retain exclusive jurisdiction in
all civil and criminal cases arising within their country in which members of the nation ...
shall be the only parties, or where the cause of action shall arise in the Cherokee Na-
tion . . . ."); Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, art. IV, 7 Stat. 14.
29. See Robert N. Clinton, Developnent of CriminalJurisdiction over Indian Lands: The His-
torical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REv. 951, 953 (1975).
30. See id. at 953-56.
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However, throughout the early 1800s, this recognition of Indian
jurisdiction began to recede, as more treaties shifted from a land-
based notion of jurisdiction-under which jurisdiction was based
on the location of the crime-to a citizenship-based notion of ju-
risdiction-under which jurisdiction was based on the status of the
perpetrator, the victim, or both.
By the late nineteenth century, U.S, policy toward Indian tribes
became an overt effort to eliminate Indian peoples through assimi-
lation and destruction of tribal sovereignty." First, Congress
officially stopped signing treaties with Indian tribes in 1871." The
federal government also forced Indian children to attend boarding
schools." These schools were often located far from reservations
and had policies intended to assimilate Indian children into Anglo-
American culture, such as forcing them to cut their hair and learn
English." Additionally, the federal government confined Indians to
reservations, and extended federal laws to reservations" in order to
lead Indians from "savagery",7 to civilization. This view is reflected
in the Secretary of the Interior's 1879 annual report: "If the Indi-
ans are to be advanced in civilized habits, it is essential that they be
accustomed to the government of law, with the restraints it imposes
and the protection it affords." 8
In the 1880s, the most outright attack on tribal sovereignty fol-
lowed the murder of Brule Chief Sin-ta-ge-le-Scka ("Spotted Tail").
Spotted Tail served as Chief of the Brule Sioux from 1865 until his
death." Another Brule named Crow Dog had also held a leader-
ship role within the tribe, as leader of the tribal police force, until
31. See id. at 955.
32. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1995).
33. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 116 (5th
ed. 2009).
34. COLIN G. CALLOWAY, FIRST PEOPLES: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF AMERICAN INDI-
AN HISTORY 345-51 (2d ed. 2004).
35. See Charla Bear, American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt Many, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(May 12, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=16516865.
36. Galloway, supra note 34, at 344.
37. In 1880, the Board of Indian Commissioners expressed support for educating In-
dian peoples: "As a savage, we cannot tolerate him any more than as a half-civilized parasite,
wanderer, or vagabond. The only alternative left is to fit him by education for a civilized
life."). Galloway, supra note 34, at 344. The perception of Indian people as savages was also
part of colonizing discourse prior to the formation of the United States. See generally, Robert
A. Williams Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Coloni-
alism in the Narrative Traditions ofFederal Indian Law, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 237, 246 (1989).
38. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROw DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIB-
AL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 136 (1994).
39. See id. at 106. For more on Spotted Tail's leadership role within Brule society, see id.
at 106-09.
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Spotted Tail removed him from the position in 1880.40 On August
5, 1881, Crow Dog shot and killed Spotted Tail.4 ' The families of
Crow Dog and Spotted Tail put an end to the murder dispute
through a traditional Brule form of retributive justice: Crow Dog's
family promptly paid Spotted Tail's family $600, eight horses, and
one blanket.42 On August 7, an Indian agent arrested Crow Dog,
knowing that the families had already settled the dispute through
Brule law.44 A murder trial in the Dakota Territory District Court
followed, and the jury found Crow Dog guilty and sentenced him
to death by hanging.45
Crow Dog appealed his conviction under a writ of habeas cor-
pus, arguing that the Dakota Territory court-a federal court--did
not have jurisdiction because the crime occurred on Indian land
and the victim was Indian. 4' The Supreme Court agreed and over-
turned Crow Dog's conviction. The Court described the case as
one where United States law was being imposed:
over the members of a community separated by race, by tradi-
tion, by the instincts of a free though savage life, from the
authority and power which seeks to impose upon them the re-
straints of an external and unknown code, . . . which judges
them by a standard made by others and not for them, . . . and
makes no allowance for their inability to understand it. It tries
them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people,
nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a different race,
... and which is opposed to the traditions of their history, to
the habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their
savage nature; one which measures the red man's revenge by
the maxims of the white man's morality.40
The Supreme Court recognized that the Brule had its own tradi-
tions for dealing with crimes committed by its members against
other Indians, and that these traditions did not align with the law
40. See id. at 107-08.
41. See id. at 1.
42. See id. at 110.
43. An Indian agent was a person appointed by the federal government to act as a liai-
son between a tribe and the federal government. These agents were often responsible for
enforcing treaty obligations and settling disputes. See generally WILLIAM C. CANBY, R., AMER-
ICAN INDIAN LAW [N A NUTSHELL 14, 20 (5th ed. 2009).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1.
46. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
47. See id. at 572.
48. Id. at 571.
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the United States imposed on Crow Dog. Because the Brule had
already resolved the murder case under its own justice system, the
Court ordered Crow Dog's release.
A very vocal public reaction resulted from Crow Dog. The deci-
sion shocked many Americans who simply could not believe that
an Indian could get away with murder and that the U.S. govern-
ment could not do anything about it.50 In 1883, the Indian Rights
Association, an activist group who claimed to be devoted to the
well-being of Indian people, issued a pamphlet titled "The Indian
Before the Law," which advocated for imposing United States law
on reservations and called for "some firm and consistent power on
a reservation that shall systematically and impartially enforce such
simple rules of morality and justice as do not conflict too hardily
with the primitive character of Indian customs or ideas ....
Congressional outcry also followed from the case. Some
Congressmen could not accept that an Indian could escape severe
punishment for a crime like murder. Within approximately one
year of the Crow Dog decision, Congress overrode the Supreme
Court's decision by enacting the Major Crimes Act (MCA), which
placed major crimes committed by Indians against Indians on res-
ervations under federal jurisdiction.3 During the Congressional
debate over the MCA, Congressmen repeatedly expressed a desire
to spread civilization to Indians." Michigan Representative Byron
Cutcheon, the sponsor of the bill,55 justified its passage by empha-
sizing the lawless nature of uncivilized Indians and tribes:
It is ... a disgrace to this nation, that there should be any-
where within its boundaries a body of people who can, with
absolute impunity, commit the crime of murder, there being
no tribunal before which they can be brought for punish-
ment. Under our present law there is no penalty that can be
inflicted except according to the custom of the tribe . . .. If
... an Indian commits a crime against an Indian on an Indian
reservation there is now no law to punish the offense except
... the law of the tribe, which isjust no law at all.
49. See id. at 572.
50. See Harring, supra note 38, at 101.
51. Id.
52. See 16 CONG. REC. 934-38 (1885).
53. See Harring, supra note 38, at 101.
54. See 16 CONG. REc. 934-38 (1885).
55. See id. at 934.
56. Id.
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Representative Cutcheon also pointed out that the Secretary of the
Interior's annual report from the previous year decried the Su-
preme Court's decision in Crow Dog and asked Congress to override
the Court's decision." Representative Cutcheon quoted from the
report:
If offenses of this character can not be tried in the courts of
the United States, there is no tribunal in which the crime of
murder can be punished ... . If the murderer is left to be
punished according to the old Indian custom, it becomes the
duty of the next of kin to avenge the death of his relative by
either killing the murderer or some one of his kinsmen.
Congress passed the bill by a vote of 240-7, with 77 not voting. 9
In its current form, the MCA subjects Indians to federal jurisdic-
tion for certain crimes committed within Indian Countryo against
another Indian.6' These crimes include murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping, maiming, incest, various forms of assault, various fed-
eral felony charges, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary,
and robbery."2 Indians prosecuted under the MCA are subject to
"the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of
the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States."6 3 If no federal law defines and punishes an offense listed in
subsection (a), the crime will still be subject to federal jurisdiction,
but will be defined and punished according to the law of the state
containing the reservation where the crime occurred." Notably,
the MCA did not define who is an Indian person.
Within a few months of Congress' passage of the MCA, Indians
challenged its constitutionality.6 Kagama, a Klamath Indian, mur-
dered another Indian on the Hoopa reservation.63 The case was
quickly certified to the Supreme Court for a ruling on whether the
federal district court had jurisdiction over Kagama's crime." The
57. See id. at 935.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 938.
60. The MCA defines Indian Country as "all land within the limits of any Indian reser-
vation under the jurisdiction of the United States government . .. all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States ... and Indian allotments ... includ-
ing rights-of-way running through the same." 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
61. See id. § 1153.
62. See id. § 1153(a).
63. See id.
64. See id. § 1153(b)
65. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 375 (1886).
66. See id. at 376.
67. See id. at 375-76.
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Supreme Court upheld the MCA and ruled that the district court
could exercise jurisdiction over Kagama."8 The Court found that
the MCA was a constitutional exercise of congressional power,3
and expressed for the first time the doctrine of congressional ple-
nary power over Indian affairs."
The Court asserted that Indian tribal sovereignty exists as a pow-
er secondary to that of Congress, and that Congress' power over
Indian tribes is plenary." Tribes are allowed to exercise their sover-
eignty subject only to the whims of Congress, which can revoke a
tribe's ability to exercise sovereignty whenever it wants, so long as it
makes clear its intent to limit tribal sovereignty.72
B. Statutory Limits on Tribal Sovereignty and Jurisdiction
After the Major Crimes Act
Following the Supreme Court's approval of legislation limiting
tribal sovereignty based on the Kagama theory of congressional
plenary power, Congress continued to pass laws intended to break
up tribal lands and governments. In February 1887, it issued the
Dawes General Allotment Act.73 The Allotment Act divided lands
held by tribes into individual parcels, or allotments, and government
agents distributed the parcels to individual Indians.14 The surplus
parcels could then be sold to non-Indians to break up reservations.
Allotment resulted in complex checkerboard reservations, with
Indians living on tribal lands that were directly adjacent to non-
Indians living on private lands.7 ' The effects of allotment are still
visible on many reservations today, complicating the determination
of which sovereign has jurisdiction over crimes because it is often
68. See id. at 385.
69. See id. at 384-85.
70. The Court described this plenary power as follows:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful,
now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to
the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because
it never has existed anywhere else[.]
Id. at 379-80, 384-85.
71. See id.
72. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-04 (2004).
73. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-333 (1887)) (repealed 2000).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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difficult to determine whether a crime has occurred on or off of
reservation land.
In 1953, Congress announced its new formal policy to terminate
the sovereign existence of some Indian tribes. Congress's stated
goal in terminating tribal status was to aid in assimilation of tribal
members as rapidly as possible, making Indians subject to "the same
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of
the United States." 9 Under the termination policy, Congress passed
statutes eliminating the tribal status of over one hundred tribal
groups.so In addition to ending the government-to-government rela-
tionship between the United States and terminated tribes, the
termination policy also transferred jurisdiction over former tribal
lands to the states and erased Indian status from members of termi-
nated tribes, removing them from the authority of the MCA."'
Congress supplemented the termination policy by passing Public
Law 280 that same year." Public Law 280 transferred criminal and
civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations from Indian tribes and
the federal government to the states, but only in Alaska, California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.8 ' Today, those states
*84
continue to exercise jurisdiction over reservation crime.
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), passed in 1968, limited the
ability of tribal courts to impose prison sentences on defendants.S
Under the ICRA, a tribal court could only sentence defendants to
prison terms of up to six months in length per offense and impose
a $500 fine." This portion of the ICRA severely limits tribal sover-
eignty because it prevents tribal governments from exercising full
discretion to determine how to punish crimes committed on Indi-
an land. Since the passage of the ICRA, several tribes have
77. For a general discussion of jurisdictional problems following allotment policy, see
Harring, supra note 38, at 153-58.
78. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953). Following this resolution, Congress passed
additional statutes formally terminating tribes.
79. Id.
80. WILLIAM C. CANBYJR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw IN A NUTSHELL 61 (5th ed. 2009).
81. Id. at 61-62.
82. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26, and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). See also 25 U.S.C. § 1321
(regarding the transfer of criminal jurisdiction to states) and 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (regarding
the transfer of civil jurisdiction to states).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
84. The system of state supervision over Indian reservation presents its own problems
that are beyond the scope of this Note.
85. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1968), amended by 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006).
86. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1968), amended by 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006). See also http://
www.tribal-institute.org/lists/icra.htm.
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explicitly adopted its language into their own tribal constitutions. 7
This is likely because tribal constitutions must be approved by the
Secretary of the Interior, who has authority to reject constitutions
that do not incorporate the ICRA's civil rights protections.""
C. Supreme Court Limits on Tribal Sovereignty and
Criminal Jurisdiction After the MCA
Over the past twenty years, Indian policy development within
both the executive and legislative branches has gradually shifted
away from encouraging assimilation to promoting tribal sovereign-
ty."9 Although elected representatives have started making positive
changes, the judicial branch remains hostile to tribal interests and
has imposed severe limits on tribal sovereignty and tribal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians.
By the 1970s, federal courts developed a set of canons of con-
struction to aid the interpretation of treaties and statutes
specifically concerning Indian tribes." First, treaties between Indi-
an tribes and the federal government were to be interpreted as the
Indians themselves would have understood the treaties at the time
of drafting." Second, textual ambiguities were to be interpreted in
the favor of Indians." Third, any rights not explicitly removed by a
treaty, statute, or regulation are retained by Indian tribes."'
The Supreme Court both ignored decades of these developed
treaty interpretation precedents and damaged tribal sovereignty
with its 1978 decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe." In Oli-
phant, a non-Indian defendant challenged his Suquamish tribal
court conviction for assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest."
The defendant argued that the tribal court did not have authority
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants, even
87. See, e.g., LITTLE RIVER BAND OF INDIANS OF MANISTEE, MICH. CONST.; KICKAPOO
TRADITIONAL TRIBE OF TEX. CONST.
88. 25 U.S.C. § 476(d)(1) (2006) ("[T]he Secretary shall approve the constitution ...
unless the Secretary finds that the proposed constitution [is] . .. contrary to applicable
laws.").
89. See infra Part II.
90. See Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court's (Re)construction of the In-
dian Canons, 35 VT. L. REv. 623, 624 (2011).
91. See Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198 (1919).
92. See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
93. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504-05 (1973); See also Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit
Divestiture and the Supreme Court's (Re)construction of the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623, 624-
25(2011).
94. 435 U.S. 191, 191 (1978).
95. See id, at 194.
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those defendants who resided on the reservation and committed
crimes on the reservation." At the time of that case, 33 of 127 tribal
court systems actively extended their jurisdiction over non-
Indians.
Rather than deciding the case on narrower grounds and ruling
solely on the issue of Suquamish tribal court jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court ruled that all Indian tribes could not prosecute
non-Indians who commit crimes on reservations." Instead, the
Court found that federal courts had exclusivejurisdiction over these
defendants (and in P.L. 280 states, state governments have exclu-
sive jurisdiction)." In reaching its decision, the Court analyzed
several nineteenth century treaties, including the 1855 Treaty of
Point Elliot signed by the Suquamish.on Although the Court admit-
ted that the treaty was "silent as to tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians,"10 it went on to interpret ambiguous treaty language,
which indicated that the Suquamish were "dependent" on the
United States, against the Suquamish's tribal sovereignty interests,o2
in a manner contrary to the second canon of treaty construction.
The Court also analyzed several statutes regarding federal enclaves,
western territory settlement, and other statutes vaguely related to
Indian policy.'" The Court admitted that its conclusion-that Con-
gress viewed Indian tribal courts as not having criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians-was based on an "unspoken assumption" implic-
itly present in each of those statutes. 0 4 This assumption violated
the third canon of construction. The Court stated that "Congress
never expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose criminal penalties
on non-Indians ... [but we conclude that] Congress consistently
believed this to be the necessary result of its repeated legislative
actions."'00 The Court found that Indian tribes "do not have crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of
such power by Congress."" In a short dissent, Justice Marshall
96. See id. at 195.
97. See id. at 196.
98. See id. at 195.
99. See id. at 212.
100. See id. at 206.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 207 (citing the Treaty of Point Elliot art. 9, Jan. 27, 1855, 12 Stat. 927,
which states that the Suquamish "acknowledge their dependence on the government of the
United States"). The Supreme Court interpreted that language to mean that "the
Suquamish were in all probability recognizing that the United States would arrest and try
non-Indian intruders." Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 207.
103. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 204.
106. See d. at 208.
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adhered to the canons of construction, stating that "[i]n the ab-
sence of affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute . .. Indian tribes
enjoy as a necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty the right to
try and punish all persons who commit offenses against tribal law
within the reservation." 0
The other implication of Oliphant is that jurisdiction over a
crime committed on an Indian reservation was thereafter explicitly
determined by a person's status as an Indian or non-Indian.os As a
result, the Oliphant decision further emphasized the importance
of being able to determine whether a defendant is an Indian. For
these reasons, Oliphant continues to face intense criticism as an
overreach ofjudicial power.'o,
United States v. Antelope"o further explained the impact of the
MCA on criminal jurisdiction based on Indian status. The case
arose when two Indian defendants charged under the MCA chal-
lenged their convictions for a murder committed on a
reservation."' The defendants argued that the MCA violated the
Constitution because their status as Indians subjected them to a
different set of laws than a person of non-Indian status."2 The Su-
preme Court found that the MCA did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because defend-
ants prosecuted under the MCA are prosecuted because of their
political affiliation as tribal members, not because of their racial
status as Indians."'
In 1990, the Supreme Court struck yet another blow to tribal
sovereignty in Duro v. Reina."'4 In Duro, the Court held that Indian
tribes could not prosecute non-member Indians-Indians from
other tribes-who committed crimes on a reservation in which
they were not enrolled tribal members."' Congress acted quickly
107. See id. at 212 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
108. See id.
109. See, eg., Geoffrey C. Heisey, Oliphant and Tribal Criminal jurisdiction Over Non-
Indians: Asserting Congress's Plenary Power to Restore Territorial jurisdiction, 73 IND. L.J. 1051,
1062-71 (1998); Marie Quasius, Native American Rape Victims: Desperately Seeking an Oliphant-
Fix, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1902, 1935-40 (2009); Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and Its Discontents:
An Essay Introducing the Case for Reargument Before the American Indian Nations Supreme Court, 12
KAN.J.L. & PuB. PoL'y 59, 60, 65-66 (2003).
110. 430 U.S. 641,641 (1977).
111. See id. at 644.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 646-47 (1977). However, determining whether someone is Indian is not
always dependant on tribal status. See infra Part III. Some courts have found that non-enrolled
tribal members with Indian heritage are nevertheless subjected to the MCA See, e.g., United
States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 763--64. (8th Cir. 2009).
114. 495 U.S. 676, 676 (1990), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1856,
1892-93, as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 194 (2004).
115. See Dum, 495 U.S. at 684-88.
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following the Duro case to create a statutory "Duro Fix."" The fix
revised the ICRA to allow tribes to prosecute any Indian who
committed crimes on their reservations, even if the Indian
defendant was not an enrolled member of that tribe."'7 However,
the "Duro Fix" did not restore tribal authority to prosecute non-
Indians who committed on-reservation crime.
Under the current state of federal law, criminal jurisdiction over
crimes committed on reservations generally follows the patterns
illustrated in the following chart:"
"Major" Crime, as All Other Crimes
Defined by MCA
Indian perpetrator, Federal Jurisdiction (under MCA) Tribal Jurisdiction
Indian victim and Tribal Jurisdiction
Indian perpetrator, Federal Jurisdiction (under MCA) Federal (under General
Non-Indian victim and Tribal Jurisdiction Crimes Act)
and Tribal Jurisdiction
Non-Indian perpetrator, Federal Jurisdiction Federal Jurisdiction (under
Indian victim (under General Crimes Act)"' General Crimes Act)
Non-Indian perpetrator, State Jurisdiction State Jurisdiction
Non-Indian victim
Despite years of policy adversely affecting tribal rights, the Unit-
ed States has recognized that "tribal powers of self-government are
not lost merely by failure to exercise or assert them, even over a
long time., 20 As the next section demonstrates, Congress recently
took steps to reduce the problems of on-reservation crime, though
not by restoring tribal sovereignty.
116. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006).
117. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006) ("'[Plowers of self-government' means and includes
all governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial,
and all offices, bodies, and tribunals .. . including courts of Indian offenses; and means the
inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal juris-
diction over all Indians.").
118. General Guide to CriminalJurisdiction in Indian Country, TRIBAL COURT CLEARING-
HOUSE, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/jurisdiction.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
This chart does not apply to jurisdictions where Public Law 280 or other federal statutes
transferring jurisdiction to states are in force.
119. The General Crimes Act, enacted in 1817, creates federal jurisdiction, with some
judicially imposed limits, for "non-major" crimes committed in Indian Country by non-
Indians against Indians and for some crimes committed by Indians against non-Indians. See
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006). This section of the Code is also sometimes referred to as the Indian
Country Crimes Act or the Federal Enclaves Act.
120. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1977) (No. 76-5729).
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF FEDERAL POLICY REGARDING TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY & CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
The election of President Barack Obama in 2008 began a
marked shift in federal policy towards Indian tribes, both in
words and in practice. In November 2009, President Obama held
the second-ever Tribal Nations Conference, in which he invited
various tribal leaders to Washington D.C. to interact with the fed-
eral government on a nation-to-nation basis.12 ' In his address
opening the conference, the President acknowledged that "Wash-
ington can't-and shouldn't-dictate a policy agenda for Indian
Country. Tribal nations do better when they make their own deci-
sions . . . . Today's sessions are part of a lasting conversation that's
crucial to our shared future."'2 2 During the Tribal Nations Confer-
ence, President Obama also issued a memorandum outlining his
administration's commitment to consulting with Indian tribes
about laws and policies affecting their communities, stating that
"[c]onsultation is a critical ingredient of a sound and productive
Federal-tribal relationship." 1 2
In July 2010, Congress passed the Tribal Law & Order Act.2 4
Congressional hearings prior to the bill's enactment shed light on
serious problems with violent reservation crime, especially crimes
against women and children.'12 Statements at these hearings de-
scribed the federal government's trust responsibility to Indian
tribes and alleged that the federal government's failure to prose-
cute on-reservation crime when it was the only body with
jurisdiction to prosecute constituted a failure to meet its trust obli-
gations. 2 6 In the final bill, Congress recognized that the United
States has "distinct legal, treaty, and trust obligations to provide for
121. Lise Balk King, Tribes Look Back to Move Forward: Obama's Monumental Challenge in Indi-
an Country, PECHANGA, http://www.victor-rocha.com/articles/Obama's% 2 0monumental%
20challenge%20in%20Indian%20Country%20110409.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). The
first tribal conference occurred under President Clinton in 1994. See id.
122. Remarks at the Opening of the American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Nations
Conference and a Discussion with Tribal Leaders, 2009 DAILY COMP. PREs. Doc. 886 (Nov.
5, 2009).
123. Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 2009 DAILY COMP. PREs. Doc. 887 (Nov. 5,
2009).
124. Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat.
2258.
125. See, e.g., The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2009: Hearing on HR. 1924 Before the Sub-
comm. of Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2-3
(2009) (statement of Thomas J. Perrelli, Assoc. Att'y Gen.); see also id. (statement of Scott
Burns Esq., Exec. Dir., National District Attorney Association).
126. See id. (statement of ThomasJ. Perrelli, Assoc. Att'y. Gen.).
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the public safety of Indian Country."'2 The TLOA seeks to create
more accountability for federal prosecutors, to improve coordina-
tion with tribal governments, and to strengthen tribal criminal
justice programs, including tribal police and courts. 1
On July 21, 2010, President Obama praised Congress for its pas-
sage of the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) ." He noted that the
Act would help reduce reservation crime rates by increasing coop-
eration between tribes and the federal government to investigate
and prosecute crimes, and by providing additional resources to
tribal governments to more effectively fight on-reservation
crimes.' President Obama also recognized that the federal gov-
ernment's relationship with tribal governments, as defined by
treaties and other laws, compelled Congress to create the TLOA.'3 1
In order to improve the prosecution rates for Indian Country
crimes, the TLOA imposes new accountability requirements on
U.S. Attorneys. The Attorney General must collect and report data
about Indian Country crimes on an annual basis,3 2 compile infor-
mation about all crimes U.S. Attorneys declined to prosecute
(including data about the accused and victims' statuses as Indians
or non-Indians), and coordinate their prosecution with tribal jus-
tice officials.3 3 U.S. Attorneys are also given more resources to deal
with reservation crime, including new "Assistant U.S. Attorney
Tribal Liaisons"'" who work with U.S. Attorneys to ensure that
United States Attorneys Office (USAO) policies are "effective, con-
sistent, and in compliance with the overall directive to improve the
government-to-government relationship with each sovereign [Indi-
an] nation."
The TLOA also mandates increased communication and coor-
dination between federal, state, and tribal law enforcement and
court systems. Federal law enforcement agents are now required to
communicate regularly with tribal leaders, tribal victims' advocates,
tribal justice officials, and other tribal representatives regarding
127. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202 (a) (1), 124 Stat.
2258, 2262 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
128. Gideon M. Hart, A Crisis in Indian Country: An Analysis of the 7ibal Law and Order
Act of 2010, Regent U. L. Rev. 139 165-75 (2010).
129. Statement on Congressional Passage of Tribal Law and Order Legislation, 2010
DAILY Comp. PREs. Doc. 618 (July 21, 2010).
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 211(b) (14), 124 Stat.
2258, 2265.
133. See id. § 212(a) (3)-(4), 124 Stat. 2258, 2267.
134. See id. §§ 13(a)-13(b), 124 Stat. 2258, 2268-69.
135. Native American Tribes and Tnibal Liaison, THE U.S. Arr'y OFF. FOR THE W. DISTRICT
OF MICH., (Jan. 22, 2012), http://wyw.justice.gov/usao/miw/programs/native.html.
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public safety concerns and criminal regulatory policies.1" Addi-
tionally, the Secretary of the Interior must coordinate with tribes to
create long-term "tribal detention programs," which allow tribes to
contract with state and federal facilities to incarcerate criminals
and develop alternatives to incarceration.17
The TLOA also seeks to develop tribal law enforcement agencies
by providing more resources to tackle on-reservation crime. The
TLOA granted tribal law enforcement agencies access to the Na-
tional Criminal Information Center and other national crime
databases."" Tribal law enforcement officers are required to be
trained according to the same standards as federal law enforce-
ment officers, 3 ) which may improve their effectiveness.
Lastly, the TLOA amends portions of the ICRA to increase the
power of tribal courts.'4 0 For example, restrictions related to tribal
court sentencing have been relaxed.'14 Prior to the TLOA, tribal
courts could not sentence any defendant to imprisonment of more
than one year or a fine of more than $5,000, pursuant to the Indi-
an Civil Rights Act's 1986 amendments.' Following the TLOA,
tribal courts can sentence defendants to imprisonment of up to
three years for certain crimes. " However, Congress made it clear
that "nothing in [the TLOA] confers on an Indian tribe criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians."'" The Attorney General and Secre-
tary of the Interior must submit a report in 2014 that addresses
whether enhanced tribal court sentencing authority has improved
violent crime rates on reservations, and must make recommenda-
tions about whether to discontinue or enhance tribal sentencing
authority.14
Although the TLOA was a noble effort by Congress to fix some
of the criminal justice problems occurring on reservations, the
TLOA does not go far enough to return criminal prosecutorial au-
thority and sovereignty to tribes. It also does not fully comply with
the principles of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
136. SeeTribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 211 (b)(11)-(12), 124
Stat. 2258, 2264 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
137. See id. § 211 (f), 124 Stat. 2258, 2266.
138. See id. § 211 (b) (13), 124 Stat. 2258, 2264.
139. See id. § 231 (a) (1) (B), 124 Stat. 2258, 2272-73.
140. See id. § 234, § 1302, 124 Stat. 2258, 2279-82.
141. See id.
142. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006). See also TRIBAL LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE, INDIAN
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/icra.htm.
143. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, sec. 234, § 1302, 124
Stat. 2258, 2279-82 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
144. See id. § 206, 124 Stat. 2264.
145. See id. §234(f), 124 Stat. 2281.
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Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) .1 The Obama administration en-
dorsed the UNDRIP in December 2010 at the second annual Tribal
Nations Conference.147 It is a non-binding, aspirational document,
but one with international consensus represented by over 144 na-
tions voting in favor of its adoption in 2007. 14 UNDRIP recognizes
that indigenous peoples have rights under international law, in-
cluding the right to self-determination and free determination of
their political status, the right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal affairs, and the right to partici-
pate in decision-making on matters affecting their rights.149
Although it is non-binding, the executive and legislative branches
are currently exploring ways to implement its ideals through revi-
sions of domestic policies.' 0
III. PROBLEMS REGARDING TRIBAL JURISDICTION CREATED BY THE
CURRENT STATE OF FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, WHICH DOES NOT
FULLY RECOGNIZE TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
The TLOA's full impact on reservation criminal justice is yet to
be realized, but it is already apparent that the TLOA cannot reme-
dy the most serious problems of reservation crime. The TLOA only
takes a small step towards restoring full tribal sovereignty over on-
reservation criminal activities, and tribes face multiple barriers in
implementing the TLOA's provisions. Furthermore, the continued
force of the MCA leads to problems in the federal court system in
defining whether a criminal defendant is Indian, which results in a
waste ofjudicial resources in appeals over that issue.
146. See infra notes 148-149.
147. See Remarks at the White House Tribal Nations Conference, 2010 DAILY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1076 (Dec. 16, 2010); see also Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.S. MIssION TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://usun.state.gov/documents/organization/153239.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
148. UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, DECLARATION ON
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples/
DeclarationontheRightsoflndigenousPeoples.aspx.
149. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, arts 3-4, 18,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
150. For example, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held a hearing titled "Set-
ting the Standard: Domestic Policy Implications of the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples" on June 9, 2011, asking for input from Indian law experts and tribal
leaders about how to begin implementing the tenets of the UN Declaration. See "U.S. SEN-
ATE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, HEARINGS AND MEETINGS: OVERSIGHT HEARING ON
SETTING THE STANDARD: DOMESTIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE UN DECLARATION ON THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (June 9, 2011)," available at http://www. indian.senate.gov/
hearings/hearing.cfm?hearinglD=e655f9e2809e5476862f735dal6dddl6.
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A. The TLOA Does Not Restore Tribal Sovereignty over
Prosecution of Reservation Crime
Although the TLOA returns some power to tribal courts in the
form of sentencing reform, it does not restore tribal courts' ability
to prosecute and effectively sentence all crimes committed on res-
ervation territory.'" Each tribe should have the opportunity to
exercise its full self-government and self-determination rights by
deciding for itself how to handle on-reservation crime. As long as
federal jurisdiction over on-reservation crimes exists, an essentially
local community problem will continue to be regulated by a body
of law from outside the community. Professor Kevin Washburn ar-
gues that, " [i] n essence, criminal laws codify the moral foundations
of the community. Criminal law is, in that sense, critical to com-
munity identity."' One federal judge even remarked:
I did not realize, prior to taking office as an Article III judge,
that I would be presiding over drunk driving cases .... Con-
gress has seen fit to impose altogether different penalties on
Native Americans driving under the influence in Indian
Country as compared with those who drive under the influ-
ence elsewhere .... Why Congress would have done this is
beyond me.'53
The TLOA also failed to include an "Oliphant fix," which would
restore tribal jurisdiction over all persons who commit crimes with-
in tribal territory. This is a necessary step towards comprehensively
solving problems of on-reservation crime, as will be discussed fur-
ther in Part IV.
B. The MCA Has Not Solved the Problem of On-Reservation Crime,
and the TLOA Does Not Fix the MCA's Weaknesses
Although the MCA has provided the federal government the
opportunity to prosecute major reservation crimes for over one
hundred years, crime rates on reservations are still astronomically
high."4
151. See supra Part II.
152. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C.L.
REV. 779, 834 (2006).
153. United States v. Swift Hawk, 125 F. Supp. 2d 384, 384-85 (D.S.D. 2000).
154. See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
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U.S. attorneys have declined to prosecute sixty-five percent of
criminal cases on reservations.' " Violent crime rates on reserva-
tions are often more than twice the national average.' 6 As an
illustration, on a single day in 2009 at northern Minnesota's Red
Lake reservation, law enforcement investigated a suicide, three
stabbings, two shootings, and multiple domestic violence inci-
157 *158dents. Similar stories exist at reservations across the nation.
Another of the most serious categories of problems reservations
face are related to illegal drugs. Drug crimes are not covered by
the MCA, and tribes can still only sentence drug offenders to a
'59
maximum of three years per offense, with a cap at nine years.
Additionally, drug offenders are not considered violent criminals
under the Bureau of Prisons pilot program,"1 and tribal jails may
not be equipped to handle long-term incarceration of drug of-
fenders due to the cost of maintaining appropriate jail facilities.'
C. Barriers to Implementing the TLOA at the Tibal Level
Many tribes face costly barriers to implementing the TLOA re-
forms precisely because the statute amended the ICRA. Some tribal
constitutions adopted verbatim the language of the ICRA from
1968.16' Because the TLOA revised the ICRA's limitations on tribal
court systems, these tribes now would need to amend their consti-
tutions to implement the TLOA's positive changes. For example,
the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (GTB)
specifically incorporated the 1968 version of the ICRA's tribal court
sentencing limitations of a maximum of one year in jail and/or a
155. Michael Riley, Promises, justice Broken, THE DENVER POST, Nov. 21, 2007, http://
www.denverpost.com/ci_7429560.
156. Rise in Violent Crime on Indian Reservations Prompts New US Effort, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 20, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/20/native-americans-violence.
157. Id. The 2000 Census reported the population of Red Lake Reservation to be only
5,162. See THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., 2000 Census Data-Key Facts for Red Lake Reservation,
MN, KIDS COUNT CENSUS DATA ONLINE, http://HwWAkidscount.org/cgi-bin/aeccensus.
cgi?action=profileresults&area=2753512A&areaparent=27S (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
158. See, e.g., Michael Riley, justice: Inaction's Fatal Price, THE DENVER POST, Nov. 12,
2007, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_7437278 (discussing crime on the Blackfeet and Nava-
jo reservations); Lindsay Whitehurst, Crime in Indian Country: A Cloudy Image Grows Clearer,
SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, (Nov. 9, 2010).
159. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, sec. 234, § 1302, 124
Stat. 2258, 2279-82 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
160. See 7ribal Law and Order Act Pilot, BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/
inmate.programs/docs/tloa.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
161. Gideon M. Hart, A Crisis in Indian Country: An Analysis of the Tribal Law and Order
Act of 2010,23 Regent U. L. Rev. 139,174 (2010).
162. See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
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$5000 fine into its constitution.'"' In order to adopt the new sen-
tencing limitations created by the TLOA, GTB must amend its
constitution through an election called by the Secretary of the In-
terior, who will order a special election upon request from the
Tribal Council or upon receipt of a petition signed by at least 30%
of GTB qualified voters.'" Once the election is approved by the
Secretary, at least 30% of GTB eligible voters must vote in the elec-
tion for it to be valid, and the constitutional amendment can only
be adopted if a majority of voters approve the change." This pro-
cess can be costly and lengthy, and several other tribes will need to
undergo similar constitutional revisions before they can enact the
TLOA's changes.'6 6
Additionally, tribal justice systems already have limited finan-
cial resources to hire staff, prosecutors, and public defenders,'"
and the TLOA does not allocate much money to support these
systems. For example, the Department of Justice awarded
$118,395,208 to 147 tribes and tribal organizations for the 2011
fiscal year for improving tribal justice systems and crime preven-
tion programs, with some tribes receiving less than $100,000.'"
The TLOA also does not provide for a specific liaison between
tribes and federal prosecutors to help coordinate administration
of justice for on-reservation crime; it remains unclear who will
coordinate and how they are expected to undertake this effort.
Finally, the TLOA's requirement that the Attorney General and
Secretary of the Interior submit a report in 2014 regarding wheth-
er improved tribal sentencing authority should continue is
completely inconsistent with a pro-tribal sovereignty approach to
the federal-tribal relationship. The results of this report could ef-
fectively allow the Secretary to strip tribal courts of their authority
within four years of the TLOA going into effect.
163. CONSTITUTION OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDI-
ANS, art. X, §I (g).
164. See id. art. XV, § 2.
165. See id. art. XV, § 1.
166. See, e.g, CONSTITUTION OF THE KICKAPOO TRADITIONAL TRIBE OF TEXAS, arts. X
§ 2 (g), XII; CONSTITUTION OF THE LITTLE RIVER BAND OF INDIANS OF MANISTEE, MICHIGAN,
arts. III § 1(g), XIV.
167. Oral Testimony of Elbridge Coochise before the House Interior, Environment and
Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee for the Fiscal Year 2012 (May 3, 2011),
available at http://www.naicja.org/storage/HINT%20650-%20Independent%2Review%20
Team.pdf.
168. Coordinated Tribal Assistance Solicitation-FY 11 Combined Award List, DEP'T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/tribal/docs/ctas-award-list.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
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D. Failure to Define "Indian" Under the MCA Leads to Unequal
Application offustice and Wastes Federal Judicial Resources
The MCA does not adequately define who is an Indian, and Con-
gress has offered little clarification. As a result, defendants charged
under the MCA often challenge their convictions by arguing that
they are not Indian. In United States v. Rogers,16" the Supreme Court
developed a two-prong test to decide whether a person is an Indian:
whether (a) the person has "Indian blood," or (b) the person is con-
sidered an Indian by a federally recognized Indian tribe or by the
federal government.'" The second part of this test involves examina-
tion of a number of factors, and courts throughout the country do
not use uniform formulae to determine Indian status under the
test's second prong.
Part of the problem for courts in legally defining Indian status
stems from the fact that the Indians chapter of the U.S. Code de-
fines Indian by referring back to the MCA, which does not define
the term. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 states: "'Indian' means any person who
would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indi-
an under section 1153, title 18, if that person were to commit an
offense listed in that section in Indian country to which that sec-
tion applies.""' Moreover, Congress adopted alternative definitions
of Indian elsewhere in the U.S. Code. For example, the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) defines Indian as "any person who is a
member of an Indian tribe, or who is an Alaska Native and a mem-
ber of a Regional Corporation."7  Additionally, the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA) defines Indians as
all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recog-
nized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all
persons who are descendants of such members who were, on
June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any
Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons
of one-half or more Indian blood.1 3
169. 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
170. See id. at 572-73.
171. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2006). 18 U.S.C. § 1153 refers to the Major Crimes Act
(MCA).
172. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3). See also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (2006) (defining "Indian tribe" as
"any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians recog-
nized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their status
as Indians, including any Alaska Native village as defined in section 1602(c) of title 43.").
173. 25 U.S.C. § 479. The section also defines the term "tribe" as "any Indian tribe, or-
ganized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation." Id.
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These definitions are similar but not identical, due to the racial
blood component of the IRA definition. As a result, a person could
be Indian under the IRA's definition, but not Indian under the
ICWA.
Despite the passage of the TLOA, Congress has not updated the
MCA to define "Indian." A number of court cases have been decid-
ed in which defendants challenged their MCA convictions based
on their alleged lack of Indian status.' As shown above, courts also
inconsistently apply the two-prong Rogers test when determining
whether a person is Indian.
Inconsistent application of the Rogers test led to confusion within
circuit courts and a split among the federal circuit courts."-5 In the
Ninth Circuit, courts are required to consider whether the person
is an enrolled member of a recognized tribe, is receiving benefits
reserved only for Indians from a tribe or the federal government, is
subject to tribal court jurisdiction, and is socially recognized as an
Indian.76 The Ninth Circuit's test leads to unpredictability for de-
fendants charged under the MCA because it does not explain how
to give proper weight to each of these factors. In Maggi, the Ninth
Circuit found that a man with about four percent Indian blood,
from a non-recognized tribe, who occasionally took part in cultural
activities and utilized Indian Health Services, was not an Indian,
and vacated his conviction."7 In United States v. Cruz, 78 the Ninth
Circuit determined that a criminal defendant with a combined In-
dian blood quantum of about 45% with no cultural ties to a tribe,
was not an Indian for purposes of the MCA.'79 Conversely, the court
decided in Bruce that a criminal defendant was Indian because she
had about 13% Indian blood, was born on a reservation, and had
social and cultural ties to tribe."o These three cases illustrate the
174. See, e.g., United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762-63 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215,
1217-18 (9th Cir 2005).
175. The Ninth Circuit has inconsistently applied the Rogers test within its own cases,
while the Eight Circuit also employs the same Rogers test and reaches different results in
cases with facts very similar to Ninth Circuit cases. See, e.g., Maggi, 598 F.3d at 1077-83 (9th
Cir. 2010); Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 763-64 (8th Cir. 2009); Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223-27 (9th Cir.
2005).
176. See Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1226-27. St. Cloud v. United States proposed the test that the
Ninth Circuit formally adopted in Bruce. St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1460-62 (D.S.D. 1988).
The 8th Circuit also cited St. Cloud in Stymiest, but has not formally adopted the test. See Sty-
niest, 581 F.3d at 760-62.
177. 598 F.3d at 1076.
178. 554 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2009).
179. See id. at 851.
180. See 394 F.3d at 1224-25.
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inconsistencies that result from the Ninth Circuit's multi-factor In-
dian test.
In Stymiest, the Eighth Circuit recently applied the same Indian
test as the Ninth Circuit."" Even though the defendant had a very
similar background and blood quantum to the defendant in Cruz,
the court found him to be an Indian for purposes of the MCA.18 1
The court did not address how much Indian blood Stymiest actual-
ly had, but assumed that Stymiest did have "the requisite Indian
blood-his grandfather is an enrolled member and medicine man
in a Minnesota Band."1 3 The court also found that Stymiest re-
ceived treatment from Indian Health Service, submitted himself to
tribal court proceedings, and told others that he was an Indian.""
According to the court, the combination of these factors provided
the jury with enough evidence to determine that Stymiest was an
Indian.'8"
The above cases illustrate that the existence of the MCA wastes
federal resources at the trial and appellate courts. During the past
decade, many MCA convictions have resulted in appeals to the U.S.
circuit courts." During the first half of 2011, the Ninth Circuit
alone heard at least two appeals based on a defendant's Indian sta-
tus under the MCA.187
Moreover, these circuit court cases ignore other Supreme Court
jurisprudence establishing two separate forms of Indian status. The
first form is a person's political status as an Indian, which results
from a person's enrollment in an Indian tribe that is recognized as
a sovereign entity by the federal government.8 The second form is
a person's racial status, which is based on the amount of Indian
blood a person possesses; this number is also known as a person's
"blood quantum."'3 For example, the child of a fully Indian person
(100% blood quantum) and a fully non-Indian person would have
a 50% blood quantum. These two statuses often overlap because,
for enrollment, most tribes require either a minimum percentage
181. See Stymiest, 581 F3d at 762.
182. See id. at 766.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id. Courts have determined that the question of whether a defendant is Indian
for purposes of the MCA is a question of fact for the jury. See Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1227 ("Bruce
met her burden of producing sufficient evidence upon which a jury might rationally con-
clude that she was an Indian.").
186. See, e.g, Cruz, Stymiest, Maggi, supra notes 175,178.
187. See United States v. Labuff, 658 F.3d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Smith, 442 F. App'x 282-83 (9th Cir. 2011).
188. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-54 (1974).
189. See id.; WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 9-11 (5th
ed. 2009).
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of Indian blood or a direct familial link to a known tribal mem-
ber.' A person meeting a tribe's blood quantum requirement
would be enrolled as a tribal member and gain federally recog-
nized political status as an Indian.
Since federal district courts place inconsistent weight on a de-
fendant's political and racial Indian status,"' the Rogers test creates
equal protection problems. For example, if an Indian man rapes a
non-Indian woman on a reservation, he is subject to both federal
court jurisdiction pursuant to the MCA and to tribal courtjurisdic-
tion." If he is found guilty in federal court, he is sentenced
according to federal court sentencing guidelines. If a non-Indian
man rapes a non-Indian woman on a reservation, however, that
man is only subject to state criminal jurisdiction and state sentenc-
ing guidelines, as rape is not a federal crime.93 In many cases,
federal sentencing guidelines are harsher than state guidelines.'9'
Therefore, an Indian defendant may be subject to harsher pun-
ishment than a non-Indian defendant for the same crime.
Because "Indian" is such an unpredictable category under the
MCA, there are cases where defendants are found to be Indian
based solely on their racial status, and are therefore subject to dif-
ferent punishments just because of their race.
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS
Congress should incrementally repeal the MCA and revise the
TLOA to allow tribes to re-assert jurisdiction over all crimes com-
mitted by any person within their reservation boundaries. These
steps would restore sovereignty to tribes that want exclusive juris-
diction over all criminals within their boundaries and have the
resources necessary to deal with on-reservation crime. An opt-in
repeal of the MCA accompanied by revision to the TLOA would
also promote tribal sovereignty because it would allow tribes to
choose whether they want to reclaim criminal jurisdiction.
190. For a detailed analysis of the variety of ways to define Indian status under current
law, see Margo S. Brownell, Who is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at the Core
ofFederalIndian Law, 34 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 275 (2001).
191. See supra notes 174-176.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
193. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
194. See Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native American Sentencing Disparity Post-
Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REv. 723, 724-25 (2008); Charles B. Kornmann, Injustices: Applying the
Sentencing Guidelines and Other Federal Mandates in Indian Country, 13 FED. SENT'G. REP., 71-72
(2000).
195. See TimothyJ. Droske, Comecting Native American Sentencing Disparity Post-Booker, 91
MARQ. L. REv. 723, 724-25 (2008).
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A. Revise the MCA
To solve the problems associated with the MCA, Congress should
revise the statute with the intent of eventually abolishing it. Con-
gress's main purpose in enacting the MCA was to bring the rule of
law to "lawless tribes" and to assimilate Indians into American soci-
ety, as illustrated by the reactionary enactment of the law following
the Crow Dog case.'9" As assimilation is no longer a valid or official
federal policy,'"9 the continued existence of the MCA is a historical
blemish that prevents Indian tribes from fully realizing their inher-
ent sovereignty. The MCA should eventually be repealed, but not
until all tribes are able to handle the influx of criminal cases that
would appear in tribal courts. Until then, the MCA can be revised
so that it is less harmful to tribal sovereignty.
First, Congress should adopt a definition of "Indian" within the
MCA. Under this definition, an Indian for the purposes of criminal
jurisdiction should be an enrolled tribal member of a federally or
state-recognized tribe. This definition will create more uniformity
across the nation in determining whether a person is Indian, be-
cause a court's inquiry will be limited to the clearer question of
whether a defendant is a tribal member. This definition would also
return sovereign power to tribes to determine who is an Indian, as
the tribe's requirements for enrollment will effectively be the statu-
tory basis for determining whether a person is Indian. Finally, this
definition will eliminate disparate sentencing for the same crimes
in cases where someone is found to be Indian based solely on their
racial characteristics; instead of emphasizing a person's racial sta-
tus, the new definition would focus on a person's political status.
Congress should also revise the MCA to allow tribes to opt out of
its provisions. This would allow tribes to choose for themselves
whether and when to reassert exclusive jurisdiction over major res-
ervation crimes. Similarly, Congress should allow a similar opt-out
provision for the General Crimes Act.'" If all tribes eventually
choose to opt-out of the MCA and the General Crimes Act, both
should be abolished. However, these opt-out provisions will only be
effective if tribal courts regain the power to effectively sentence
criminal perpetrators, which requires further revisions to the
TLOA.
196. See supra Part I-A.
197. See supra Part II.
198. See supra note 119.
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B. Revise the TLOA
Like revisions to the MCA, any revisions to the TLOA should ful-
ly support a tribe's choice to determine how to administer justice
within its territory. The following proposed revisions would allow
tribes to opt-in to the implementation of the revision. Moreover,
any revisions should be adopted as stand-alone statutes rather than
as amendments to the ICRA, so that tribes may adopt the provi-
sions without the additional burden of amending their
constitutions.
First, Congress should remove the sentencing cap imposed on
tribal courts by the TLOA and other statutes. This would allow
tribal governments to establish their own sentencing guidelines for
their courts and would help make tribal courts more effective in
cases where they have exclusive jurisdiction (i.e., if the tribe has
opted out of the MCA, or if other federal criminal charges do not
apply to the crime). Additionally, tribes could then enact a one-
time constitutional amendment that would permanently remove
sentencing caps from their constitutions, making later revisions
and adjustments to tribal court sentencing authority more efficient
by making them statutory rather than constitutional.
Congress should also add an "Oliphant fix," which would restore
jurisdiction to the tribes over all persons committing crimes on
their reservations, regardless of political or racial status. This would
eliminate the need to establish a defendant's background as a basis
for jurisdiction. It would also restore tribes' inherent sovereign
power to address all crimes committed within their territory. Sever-
al scholars and Indian leaders have argued for this change since
the decision in Oliphant, because this change would close a major
loophole in reservation criminal jurisdiction.'" Although the pro-
posed "SAVE Native Women Act" is a positive step towards
remedying the harms of Oliphant, because it would allow tribal ju-
risdiction over most domestic violence cases, it does not fully
restore inherent tribal jurisdiction and will therefore have a limited
impact on overall reservation crime.200 Additionally, the recent
199. See generally, Samuel E. Ennis, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal jurisdiction
Over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REv. 553
(2009); Marie Quasius, Native American Rape Victims: Desperately Seeking an Oliphant Fix, 93
MINN. L. REv. 1902 (2009).
200. The SAVE Act limits the expansion of tribal jurisdiction to crimes involving dating
or domestic violence. See SAVE Native Women Act, S. 1763, 112th Cong. §§ 204(a)-204(d)
(2011). Therefore, if a native woman is a victim of violence committed on a reservation by a
non-Indian with whom she is not in a relationship, the tribe will not have jurisdiction. Addi-
tionally, the SAVE Act allows non-Indian defendants to petition to remove their case from
tribal jurisdiction if their victim is non-Indian, or if the tribe cannot prove that the victim is
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Senate reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) would implement the same jurisdictional changes as the
proposed SAVE Act (using nearly identical language),20 ' but like
the SAVE Act, the VAWA provisions will likely be insufficient in
solving reservation crime problems.202
If Congress adopts the changes proposed in this Note and tribes
opt-in to the changes, jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian
Country would always fall exclusively under tribal jurisdiction. These
proposed changes would eliminate the complicated jurisdictional
rules illustrated by the table in Part I. Instead, a uniform system
would exist that would primarily rely on geographic boundaries, ra-
ther than political or racial status. To implement these proposals,
Congress will need to amend existing statutes (MCA, TLOA, and
ICRA) to remove the provisions mentioned in this section that are
most problematic for tribes. After this step, Congress would be able
to create a new, comprehensive statute to restore all criminal juris-
diction to tribes and lay out all requirements for opting in to the
new system. Then, any subsequent changes that need to be made
could be implemented in one place, eliminating the need for statu-
tory cross-references.
C. Potential Criticisms of Proposed Reforms
Many of the critiques of expanding tribal jurisdiction relate to
concerns that tribes are unable to manage all reservation crime,
prosecution, and punishment due to a lack of resources,203 or that
it would somehow be unfair to subject non-Indian defendants to
tribal courtjurisdiction .o
Indian. See id. Senator Daniel Akaka noted that the SAVE Act would allow tribes to exercise
concurrent criminal jurisdiction over all persons committing acts of domestic violence on
Indian reservations, by nature of tribes' inherent "power of self-government." 157 CONG.
REc. S6919-20 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 2011) (statement of Sen. Daniel Akaka).
201. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2011, 112th Cong. S. 1925 § 904
(passed by the Senate on April 26, 2012).
202. See infra note 200.
203. Testimony of Elbridge Coochise before the House Interior Environment and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Subcommitte for the Fiscal Year 2012 (May 3, 2011), available
at http://www.naicja.org/storage/HINT%20650-%20Independent%2Review% 20Team.pdf.
204. DAVID MUHLHAUSEN AND CHRISTINA VILLEGAS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT:
REAUTHORIZATION FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED (March 29, 2012), available at http://
www.heitage.org/research/reports/2012/03/the-violence-against-women-act-reauthorization-
fundamentally-flawed (asserting that a proposal to return criminal jurisdiction to Indian
tribes is "unprecedented, unnecessary, and dangerous" because "tribal courts do not
necessarily adhere to the same constitutional provisions that protect the rights of all
defendants in federal and state courts.").
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It is possible that some tribal courts and tribal jails may not well
equipped to handle an increase in the number of cases and perpe-
trators due to increased financial costs. 20' However, making tribal
court jurisdiction an opt-in choice for the tribe can help solve this
issue, because tribes will presumably not attempt to take over juris-
diction if they do not have the resources to do so. Additionally,
tribes and states could consider entering into agreements to share
jail resources. A variety of federal grants are available to support
tribal justice programs,20" and the TLOA also created a pilot pro-
gram for using federal prisons as housing for defendants
sentenced in tribal court.20 Under the pilot program, however, the
Bureau of Prisons can only incarcerate up to one hundred tribal
members convicted of violent crimes (as defined by the MCA) who
are sentenced to two or more years of imprisonment by a tribal
court." These limits on the pilot program make it minimally useful
to tribes, and should be lifted.
Additionally, many express concern about subjecting non-Indians
to Indian courts and sentencing systems. First, the composition of
reservation juries may present equal protection problems, because
often only tribal members serve on tribal court juries. 20 To address
this concern, tribes could consider expanding their jury selection
beyond tribal members and make all persons living within reserva-
tions boundaries eligible for jury selection. Moreover, tribal courts
may actually protect defendants more from "arbitrary prosecutorial
power" than state courts, as all judicial proceedings for crimes pun-
ishable by imprisonment are guaranteed a jury trial.2 0 Second,
some express concern about subjecting non-Indians to the
strangeness, unfamiliarity, or potential bias of tribal courts.2 1 1 This
205. Gideon M. Hart, A Crisis in Indian Country: An Analysis of the Tribal Law and Order
Act of 2010, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 139, 174 (2010).
206. See Improving Criminal Courts FY 2011 Competitive Grant Announcement, DEPT OF
JUST., http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/11CrimCourtsSol.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2012); Greg Guedel, DOJ Grants Available for Tribaljustice Programs, NATIVE LEGAL UPDATE
BLOG (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.nativelegalupdate.com/2011/03/articles/doj-grants-
available-for-tribal-justice-programs.
207. See Tribal Law and Order Act Pilot, BUREAU OF PRISONs, http://www.bop.gov/
inmate.programs/docs/tloa.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
208. See id.
209. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sovereign Comity: Factors Recognizing Tribal Court Criminal
Convictions in State and Federal Courts, 45 CT. REV. 12, 16 (2008)
210. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIz.. ST. L. J. 403, 429
(2004) (contrasting state and tribal court "right to trial by jury," noting that state courts are
only required to give a defendant a jury trial if he is charged with a felony or misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment of at least six months).
211. Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CA. L. REV.
1165, 1191 (2010); Bethany R. BergerJustice and the Outsider:Jurisdiction over Nonmem-
bers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 1047, 1050-51 (2005).
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argument is no different from arguing that a person from Michi-
gan should not be subject to a California court's jurisdiction
because he is unfamiliar with the court procedures. Like state
laws and procedures, many tribal law and court procedures are
clear-tribes often codify them either in a tribal code or in judi-
* * *212
cial opinions.
Finally, the geographic approach to tribal court jurisdiction will
not always be entirely clear due to complex reservation boundaries.
As mentioned above,13 the early 20th century allotment policy cre-
ated reservations with pockets of land held in fee by non-Indians.
Because of complicated court decisions, the jurisdiction to which
these lands are subject is not always clear. Congress could address
these problems on a case-by-case basis, helping tribes better define
their boundaries at the time they reassert jurisdiction.
D. One Tribal Court Success Story
In 2001, the Tulalip tribes of Washington received approval to
begin handling minor criminal cases.2 14 Prior to that date, the state
of Washington prosecuted most reservation crime."'1 The Tulalip
court employs a variety of tools to combat reservation crime,
including a Juvenile Diversion Panel, which aims to change non-
violent Tulalip youth offenders into positive and productive
members of the community,2 1 and a Wellness Court, which helps
drug offenders rehabilitate themselves in order to avoid jail time.
Since 2002, the Tulalip have experienced a significant drop in
reservation crime rates, including a 9% drop in criminal case filings
during 2010, despite an increase in the number of adult enrolled
212. See, e.g., NAv. R. CR. P., available at http://www.navajocourts.org/Rules/
crirninalpro.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2011); Tulalip Tribes of Washington Law and Order
Code, available at http://www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/Portals/0/pdf/49_law andorder.pdf
(last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
213. See supra Part I-A.
214. WENDY A. CHURCH, RESURRECTION OF THE TULALIP TRIBES' LAW AND JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND ITS Socio-ECONOMIC IMPACTS 12 (May 21, 2006), available at http://
www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/Portals/0/pdf/departments/tribal court/Tulalip-History-of-Law-
&-Justice.pdf.
215. Id. at 6-7.
216. Tulalip-Based juvenile Diversion Panel, TRIBAL CT.: Juv., http://www.tulaliptribes-
nsn.gov/Home/Government/Departments/TribalCourt/JuvenileDiversion.aspx (last visited
Feb. 25, 2012).
217. Tulalip Tribal Wellness Court, TRIBAL CT.: WELLNESS CT., http://
www.ttlaliptribes-nsn.gov/Home/Government/Departments/TribalCourt/WellnessCourt.aspx
(last visited Feb. 25, 2012). The Tulalip Wellness Court has helped defendants who have
successfully completed the rehabilitation and probation program avoid approximately
10,000 jail days, which also helps conserve the tribe's financial resources.
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tribal members.2 "" The Tulalip Court has also partnered with the
University of Washington's Tribal Court Public Defense Clinic to
provide low-cost public defender services for tribal court cases.2"
The Tulalip court system illustrates how successful tribes can be
when they have control over their own affairs and have the
authority to protect their citizens. Congress should re-affirm its
commitment to tribal sovereignty and its rejection of assimilation
policies by fully restoring tribes' abilities to choose whether, how,
and when they will prosecute crimes impacting their communities.
CONCLUSION
During a November 10, 2011 Senate Committee on Indian Af-
fairs hearing regarding the SAVE Native Women Act, panelist
Thomas Heffelfinger relayed a remark from a councilmember of
the Coeur D'Alene tribe: "How can tribes have sovereignty when
they can't protect their children and their women?"220 Indian wom-
en and children are especially affected by the lack of tribal
jurisdiction over reservation crime, but the high crime rates on
reservations affect all who live there. Tribes need to be given an
opportunity to reassert their sovereign control over all reservation
criminal matters in order to protect their communities.
If the federal government intends to comply with its self-stated
support of inherent Indian tribal sovereignty, it should restore full
power to tribes to prosecute all crimes committed within their ter-
ritory, regardless of the race or political status of the perpetrator,
and it should stop placing arbitrary limits on tribal court sentences.
Congress should comprehensively overhaul the major statutes lim-
iting tribal control over reservation crime, including the Major
Crimes Act, General Crimes Act, Indian Civil Rights Act, and the
Tribal Law and Order Act. A comprehensive approach can simplify
the current statutory system and re-establish an aspect of tribal sov-
ereignty that will help tribes protect their reservation communities
from crime.
218. TULALIP TRIBAL COURT, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, http://www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/
Portals/0/pdf/departments/tribal_court/2010_AnnualReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2012).
219. Wendy Church, Why Does the Tibe Use the UW TDbal Court Public Defense Clinic?,
SEE-YAHT-SUB, http://www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/Portals/0/pdf/departments/tribal-court/
Why-Does-the-Tribe-Use-the-UW-Tribal-Court-Public-Defense-Clinic.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2012).
220. See Stand Against Violence and Empower ("SAVE") Native Women Act: Hearing on S. 1763
Befom the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 1-2 (2011) (statement of Thomas
Heffelfinger).
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